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The global community has set itself the 
challenge of meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 as a way to 
combat world poverty and hunger. In 2007, the 
halfway point, it is clear that many countries 
will not be able to meet the MDGs without 
undertaking significantly greater efforts. One 
constraint that needs to be overcome is that 
development interventions—projects, programs, 
policies—are all too often like small pebbles 
thrown into a big pond: they are limited in 
scale, short-lived, and therefore have little 
lasting impact. This may explain why so many 
studies have found that external aid has had 
weak or no development impact in the 
aggregate, even though many individual 
interventions have been successful in terms of 
their project- or program-specific goals.  
Confronted with the challenge of meeting 
the MDGs, the development community has 
recently begun to focus on the need to scale up 
interventions. Scaling up means taking 
successful projects, programs, or policies and 
expanding, adapting, and sustaining them in 
different ways over time for greater 
development impact. This emphasis on scaling 
up has emerged from concern over how to 
deploy and absorb the substantially increased 
levels of official development assistance that 
were promised by the wealthy countries at 
recent G8 summits. A fragmented aid 
architecture complicates this task; multilateral, 
bilateral, and private aid entities have 
multiplied, leading to many more—but smaller—
aid projects and programs and increasing 
transaction costs for recipient countries. In 
response, some aid donors have started to 
move from project to program support, and in 
the Paris Declaration, official donors committed 
themselves to work together for better 
coordinated aid delivery.  
The current focus on scaling up is not 
entirely new, however. During the 1980s, as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
increasingly began to engage in development 
activities, scaling up emerged as a challenge. 
NGO interventions were (and are) typically 
small in scale and often apply new approaches. 
Therefore, the question of how to replicate and 
scale up successful models gained prominence 
even then, especially in connection with 
participatory and community development 
approaches. Indeed, the current interest among 
philanthropic foundations and NGOs in how to 
scale up their interventions is an echo of these 
earlier concerns. 
In response to this increased focus on 
scaling up—and its increased urgency—this 
policy brief takes a comprehensive look at what 
the literature and experience have to say about 
whether and how to scale up development 
interventions.  
To Scale Up or Not to Scale Up? 
The first question to ask is whether a project, 
program, or policy should be scaled up at all, 
and, if so, by how much, for how long, and in 
what direction or dimension. Dams and flood-
protection works have natural physical or 
environmental limits. Replication or scaling up 
beyond those limits makes no sense. On the 
other hand, attaining universal school 
enrollment in quality primary schools and 
providing clean water to all are explicit targets 
under the MDGs, and most countries are way 
below the scale needed to achieve these goals. 
It is not surprising, then, that it is especially in 
the areas of social policy—education, health, 
poverty reduction programs, rural and urban 
community development, and so on—that 
scaling up is of particular concern.  
A decision to scale up a program (or project 
or policy) requires a reflection on its optimal 
size. Should the program operate on a national, 
provincial, or only local level? Diseconomies of 
scale, quality/scale trade-offs, and 
institutional/organizational constraints might 
limit the scaling-up path. Therefore, scaling up 
does not necessarily mean national coverage. 
On the other hand, scaling up also may entail 
going beyond national borders. To be effective, 
some programs need to be expanded to a 
regional scale. This is typically the case for 
regional infrastructure, and for water, energy, 
and environmental programs—especially for 
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small countries in Africa, Central America, 
Central Asia, and southeastern Europe. Some 
interventions must operate on a global scale, 
such as programs to combat global epidemics 
(HIV/AIDS) or global environmental threats 
(global warming). 
Considerations about desirable size are 
particularly important for programs based on 
participatory processes. Because these 
programs are highly contextual and depend on 
the trust and processes established in a 
community, the scope for expansion might be 
limited. If greater outreach is sought, a 
“franchise model” may be suitable, where basic 
principles are transferred to another 
environment, but ample room is left for the 
establishment of context-specific decisions and 
interactions among community members. Good 
examples of organizations that successfully 
transferred activities are the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the 
Grameen Bank—microcredit programs in 
Bangladesh that are replicating some of their 
programs in African countries. In a very 
different field, Transparency International, the 
global anticorruption NGO, scaled up across 
countries via a franchise model. 
Scaled-up interventions should not always 
last indefinitely. Some interventions have a 
natural limit. For example, privatization has a 
limit both in terms of extent (how much to 
privatize) and in terms of duration: once all 
requisite firms and assets have been privatized, 
the process needs to be wound down. Scale 
limits and sunset provisions are especially 
important in areas where public action is taken 
to correct for what are at best seen as 
temporary private market failures (state banks, 
state marketing boards, and so on). In these 
cases, the critical issue is how to ensure an 
effective enabling environment for private 
initiatives rather than providing large-scale, 
long-term public intervention. 
Finally, there has been a lively debate in the 
literature about the dimensions of scaling up. It 
helps to distinguish among horizontal, vertical, 
and functional scaling up. Horizontal scaling up 
refers to the expansion of coverage of a 
project, program, or policy across more people 
and greater space. Vertical scaling up refers to 
creating the organizational and political 
framework needed to permit going to a larger 
scale. Functional scaling up means going 
beyond one function (for example, health or 
education) to include others. The key here is 
that, usually, horizontal and vertical scaling 
must go hand in hand: expanding programs to 
cover more people across wider geographic 
areas inevitably requires working with higher 
level (provincial, national, regional, and even 
global) institutions and political forces. 
Functional scaling up is more of an optional 
dimension, but functional stovepiping can be a 
serious threat to the long-term success of 
development interventions. These are the risks 
that the new global “vertical funds,” such as 
the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria, now face as they intervene in countries 
with weak overall health systems. Mexico’s 
conditional cash transfer program, 
Oportunidades (formerly Programa de 
Educación, Salud, y Alimentación, or Progresa), 
which gives cash benefits to millions of poor 
families provided they use certain public 
services, clearly benefits from combining 
health, education, and nutrition interventions.  
The Building Blocks of Scaling Up 
The answers to the questions of what to scale 
up, how far, how long, and in what dimension 
cannot be set in stone. It is important to be 
aware of the questions and address them 
systematically and continuously when 
proceeding with the implementation. At the 
same time, it is important to consider how to 
scale up. Scaling up takes time, often 10 to 15 
years, or more. This long time horizon poses 
great challenges: donors shift priorities, 
governments change, NGO funding is driven by 
fashion, and agency managers and staff move 
in and out. The long time horizon requires that 
scaling up be perceived as a systemic effort, 
not a short-term fad. Experiences with 
successful scaling-up programs have shown the 
importance of long-term commitment on the 
part of institutions, donors, and individuals. 
External partners need to stay the course. At 
the same time, programs have to be designed 
in such a way that they survive changes in 
government. This requires a systematic strategy 
for how to scale up. At a minimum, it requires a 
basic set of institutional values and incentives 
to ensure that key actors are continuously 
searching for ways to build on successful 
interventions, which, in turn, ensures that they 
are replicated, expanded, transferred, and 
adapted in other settings.  
There are three building blocks for 
designing scaling-up strategies and instilling 
them with the basic values and incentives of 
vision, drivers, and space to grow. 
Vision 
Ideally, a vision for scaling up should be 
developed as the first phase of a program, 
frequently called a pilot, is being put into place. 
Pilots should be designed in such a way that 
they can be scaled up if successful. However, 
such a vision for scaling up rarely exists when 
programs are first designed and initiated. Far 
too frequently, donors and governments design 
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operations as onetime interventions. Projects 
that are “expensive boutiques” with high unit 
costs and high management and human skill 
intensities may be successful on a limited scale, 
but they generally cannot be and are not being 
replicated on a larger scale. Because not every 
project or program could or should be scaled 
up, the question of whether scaling up is 
appropriate should be explicitly factored into 
the decision of whether and how to implement 
the intervention in the first place. If program 
designers believe that their interventions 
eventually should be taken to a larger scale, 
then they need a vision and a strategy for how 
to proceed beyond the first phase or pilot 
project. Oportunidades is a good example of a 
program whose designers had a clear vision of 
the appropriate scale of intervention; although 
it started with a pilot phase, it aimed from the 
very beginning to eventually provide conditional 
cash transfers to all of Mexico’s poor. 
Drivers  
Scaling up is a dynamic process requiring a 
force—or driver—to propel it forward. First, 
there has to be an idea, an innovation that 
meets a need or creates a demand among 
people. Second, there has to be a leader or 
champion. All successful programs that have 
expanded from small beginnings have benefited 
from charismatic leaders who are endowed with 
a vision, are persistent in their efforts, are 
often well connected to major stakeholders and 
constituencies, and have the ability to 
command respect and guide people. The 
innovative idea that microcredit could help poor 
entrepreneurs was propelled by the vision and 
leadership of Mohammed Yunnus and Fazle 
Hasan Abed to achieve the tremendous scale 
and impact of the Grameen Bank and BRAC. 
Similarly, the notion that an NGO can combat 
global corruption required the inspired 
leadership of Peter Eigen, which led to the 
establishment of Transparency International. 
Finally, external catalysts can serve as drivers 
of change and scaling up. They might be crises 
such as natural disasters or economic melt-
downs. Or they can be agendas introduced by 
outside actors. In central and southeastern 
Europe, the prospect of accession to the 
European Union has been a driver of sustained 
change, reform, and scaling up for more than a 
decade.  
Space to Grow 
Ideas, champions, and external catalysts are 
not enough, however. For interventions to be 
scaled up, they need space in which to grow. 
Sometimes, such space already exists, but more 
often than not it has to be created. A number 
of interrelated spatial dimensions must be 
available if interventions are to be replicated 
and scaled up successfully. These are discussed 
in turn below. 
Fiscal Space  
In most cases, increased capital costs can only 
be covered by determining what other 
expenditures can be reduced or what additional 
revenues can be raised. In Mexico, for example, 
existing social programs were, very 
transparently, phased out to make room for 
Oportunidades. Since most budgetary decisions 
need endorsements by parliaments, however, 
creating fiscal space also involves determining 
whether there will be political support for 
curtailing certain activities. 
Political Space 
Scaling up requires political commitment. 
Political dynamics often change as programs 
grow. Small programs tend to be watched 
benevolently and with appreciation by those in 
power. But as the programs expand, as they 
build constituencies around them and replace 
other activities, they can be perceived as 
threatening and evoke negative reactions. 
Creating political space is a long-term process 
that must be started early on in the scaling-up 
journey. It requires advocacy and the 
legitimization of the programs. This goes 
beyond simply informing decisionmakers about 
the benefits of the program. It requires 
creating constituencies and mobilizing 
stakeholders who are willing to place the 
expanded programs on their political platforms. 
For this to occur, win-win solutions need to be 
forged and at times, second-best outcomes 
must be accepted. Advocacy, political 
engagement, leadership formation, and 
participation in the political process need to be 
integral parts of programs hoping to become 
larger and be politically sustained. In China’s 
many successful scaling-up experiences, the 
political space created and sustained by the 
Communist Party clearly played a significant 
role. 
Economic Space 
Scaling up requires that sufficient demand must 
exist for the services offered by the larger 
program, or that this demand can be readily 
created. Insufficient demand is often an issue 
for preventive-health and family-planning 
services and sometimes, albeit less so, for 
education programs, where cultural factors, 
earnings opportunities for children, or previous 
poor service provision might inhibit demand. 
Many agricultural innovations could not be 
scaled up because farmers were unable to 
accept the risks inherent with new crop 
varieties, inputs, or technologies. In the case of 
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illicit drug-substitution programs, substitute 
crops could not compete with higher value drug 
production. A realistic assessment of demand 
and of the factors needed to create it is 
therefore an essential step in scaling up 
successfully.  
Capacity Space 
Institutions that are unwilling or unable to 
operate the larger program are perhaps the 
single biggest constraint to scaling up. The 
problem is typically twofold. First, institutions 
lack the human resources, skills, and processes 
to manage the enlarged program. Second, they 
are unwilling to support the change process 
needed to scale up. The inertia of institutions, 
especially in the public sector, is a significant 
impediment. Therefore, it is essential to provide 
incentives for change, as well as to build a 
constituency within the institution—not only at 
the highest level of management, but also at 
the middle-management and staff levels. The 
standard view of development practitioners that 
training will create the capacity required is 
inadequate. Training is one component, but it is 
by no means sufficient. Improving 
organizational capacity, incentives, and 
commitment are equally important. In some 
cases, existing organizations were bypassed for 
successful scaling up, as was the case with 
Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Program 
to support community-driven public-service 
provision. And setting up separate donor-
supported project implementation units is often 
likely to harm the chances of scaling up and 
sustaining interventions in the longer term, as 
the World Bank has learned the hard way. 
Cultural Space  
It is particularly important for participatory 
programs and for programs that deliver 
culturally sensitive services (education, health, 
family planning) to determine whether the 
expanded or replicated program will fit 
culturally. Programs often need to be adjusted 
as they are being extended or replicated to 
accommodate other values or social-interaction 
patterns, especially in multicultural 
communities and countries, or when successful 
interventions are transferred to another country 
or continent. 
Partnership Space 
It is also essential to determine whether 
external and internal partners will continue to 
support the program, or whether new partners 
will be required. In most successful scaling-up 
operations, partners were a key factor in 
helping to maintain the momentum and focus. 
They can support the drivers and provide 
financial support in the scaling-up process. 
Successful programs like BRAC and the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh have cooperated 
readily with partners despite clearly being in 
the driver’s seat. The long-term partnership 
among international drug companies, 
international donors, and national health 
agencies was essential for the success of the 
River Blindness Eradication Program in Africa. 
And even as China has chosen its own way of 
scaling up and sustaining its highly successful 
development programs, it has frequently  
sought the technical and financial input of 
outside partners (as in the case of the Loess 
Plateau Watershed Rehabilitation Project 
supported by the World Bank). Effective 
cooperation among aid agencies remains a 
special challenge, even as official agencies have 
pledged to coordinate their activities under the 
Paris Declaration. 
Space for Learning  
Scaling up is not a linear process; it extends 
over many years and navigates much uncharted 
territory. Though a solid process must be laid 
out, it also needs to be adjusted regularly. 
Monitoring, evaluation, and feedback loops are 
important for learning and adaptation. BRAC 
and Oportunidades effectively used monitoring 
systems to provide learning opportunities, while 
China’s ability to adapt its policy reforms and 
program implementation has been one of its 
greatest assets. 
Five Lessons  
Pulling together the various elements of the 
scaling-up story, five key lessons emerge for 
scaling up most development interventions: 
1.  Scaling Up Needs Leadership  
and Values 
More than anything else, scaling up is about 
political and organizational leadership and 
values. If leaders don’t drive the process of 
scaling up, if institutions don’t embody a clear 
set of values that empower managers and staff 
to continuously challenge themselves to scale 
up, and if individuals within institutions don’t 
have any incentives to push themselves and 
others to scale up successful interventions, 
then the current pattern of pervasive “short-
termism” and fragmentation will continue to 
characterize national policies and programs as 
well as the policies and approaches of donors. 
No scaling-up manual, no check list, and no 
compilation of case studies will make a lasting 
difference.  
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2.  Scaling Up Needs Political  
Constituencies  
Social change needs to be embedded in a 
society and needs to be supported by political 
constituencies. These constituencies generally 
do not emerge by themselves; they need to be 
created. Far too often, development 
practitioners believe that the message of “good 
programs” will be sufficient to secure support. 
Political constituency–building involves more 
than providing information about a successful 
program. Political constituencies need to 
become actively engaged in the process, and 
political leaders need to find that it is in their 
interest to place the concerns to be addressed 
by the scaling-up process on their agendas. 
Often “second-best” solutions have to be 
accepted in order to be supported politically. 
Scaling up is not only a technical process, but 
also a political one—it moves an agenda into 
the public domain and stirs political debate. But 
care needs to be taken to ensure that the 
agenda will not be partisan. Political parties 
move in and out of power, but scaling up is a 
long-term process, and the agenda needs to be 
broadly anchored in a political system.  
3.  Scaling Up Needs Incentives  
and Accountability 
Institutions work best with appropriate 
incentives, and accountability is the best way to 
ensure that incentives are aligned between the 
goals of the individual and the goals of society. 
Scaling up is a change process, but changes are 
often stalled by unwilling players. In social-
delivery programs, these players are often 
public bureaucracies where inertia, combined 
with inadequate skills and human resources, 
prevents change from happening. Scaling-up 
processes thus need to include incentives for 
the key actors. One important tool for creating 
incentives is to plan for incremental steps with 
early results, rather than building the perfect 
program to be rolled out after a long 
preparation time without intermediate results. 
Accountability is important for pilot 
projects, but its importance increases as 
programs are taken to scale, systems become 
larger, and the visibility of and political 
attention to the programs increase. 
Accountability is often directed upward toward 
the organizational and political leadership. But 
a particular concern related to expanding 
programs is “elite capture.” As program size 
increases, political interests become more 
pronounced and the risk that particular elites 
will “capture” programs for their specific 
interests increases. Therefore accountability 
downward toward beneficiaries and participants 
in programs is equally important. Large 
organizations are often not able (or willing) to 
exercise top-down controls effectively. 
Downward accountability provides for corrective 
mechanisms and systemic controls. Citizen 
report cards, beneficiary surveys, and results-
based monitoring are all ways to ensure 
accountability. Good leaders make sure they 
ground their efforts in constant reality checks 
at the base. 
4.  Scaling Up Needs Systematic Monitoring 
and Evaluation 
It therefore comes as no surprise that effective 
evaluation and monitoring is critical for a 
sustained scaling-up process. Monitoring and 
evaluation will be necessary on two levels: first, 
for the original limited-scale or pilot operation 
and, second, during the scaling-up process. The 
successful scaling up of the BRAC operation in 
Bangladesh depended crucially on regular 
feedback from monitoring and evaluation 
systems. This allowed the programs to be 
adjusted as they expanded. One of the secrets 
of Progresa’s success was the existence of 
credible impact evaluations, undertaken with 
randomized samples. The evaluations clearly 
demonstrated the impact of the program and 
thus played an important role in convincing 
politicians to maintain and build it through 
successive electoral cycles. But even simple 
evaluations can play an essential role in 
providing feedback on whether scaling up is 
embedded in the institutional and managerial 
values of an organization, as was the case with 
recent evaluations of the United Nations 
Development Programme’s country programs. 
Unfortunately, this type of evaluation practice 
remains the exception rather than the rule. 
5.  Scaling Up Benefits from an Orderly  
and Gradual Process 
The literature on the diffusion of innovations 
focuses on the spontaneous spread of 
innovations and observes that some 
ideas/innovations can spread very quickly, 
especially when they are market driven (for 
example, the diffusion of information and 
communications technologies). However, social 
process innovations—which rely on political 
processes; public-sector bureaucracies; and, 
often, participatory, bottom-up community 
engagement—generally do not spread 
instantaneously or spontaneously. An orderly 
and gradual process, careful logistical planning, 
a clear definition of partners’ roles, and good 
communication are important ingredients to 
scale up development interventions.  
Scaling up is a complex and long-term 
challenge, and it may seem from the literature 
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that it is almost impossible to get right. But 
many examples of successful scaling up 
initiatives show that it is indeed possible—
though such examples should be far more 
numerous. If, for starters, the aid agencies and 
private foundations were to seriously put scaling 
up on their agendas, there would be hope for a 
significant improvement in aid effectiveness. 
There would also be many more demonstrations 
of what can and must be done to achieve serious 
progress toward the MDGs and thus toward 
reducing global poverty and hunger. 
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